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The Design of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) II Limits             
Incentives for the Adoption of the Euro
What you need to know:
Although a number of countries may want to 
join the euro, the ERM II exposes aspiring 
members to short term risks and should be 
reformed. 
What is this research about?
Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, 
sixteen European Union (EU) member 
states have adopted the common currency. 
Eleven member states still remain less than 
full participants of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). As one of the 
preconditions of entry into the eurozone, 
potential entrants are required to adopt 
successfully the framework of the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) II for a minimum of two 
years. ERM II stipulates the maintenance of a 
stable exchange rate peg vis-à-vis the euro, 
typically with a fluctuation margin no greater 
than +/- 15%. The ERM II participants are mostly 
made up of smaller new EU member states. 
Some of the larger economies – such as the 
United Kingdom, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary – have not entered ERM II. While their 
individual circumstances and motivations vary, 
this paper provides a unifying framework for 
analyzing the incentives to enter ERM II as a 
decision distinct from the goal of adopting the 
euro.
What did the researcher do?
Utilizing a comparative study of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, two recent EU entrants 
and aspirants for full EMU membership, this 
paper studies the potential pitfalls in the 
transition to EMU, specifically with respect to the 
required two year participation in ERM II. 
 
What did the researcher find?
The paper attributes exchange rate regime 
choices in the two countries to the history 
of public debt, inflation, and the sources of 
investment financing. Differences in financial 
market development and international liabilities 
underscore the risks and benefits of ERM II, 
and lead to a conflict between short and long-
term policy objectives. This suggests that 
the framework of ERM II should perhaps be 
reconsidered in light of the new challenges 
that potential euro-area entrants face. In an 
environment characterized by large and volatile 
capital flows, maintaining an explicit exchange 
rate band can be quite costly. One possible 
solution would be to widen the target band, as in 
1993 when participating currencies came under 
attack. An alternative could be to support a target 
band of +/-15%, but without the explicit obligation 
to intervene to preserve the peg. Greater 
uncertainty about intervention to defend the band 
would likely discourage speculative attacks, while 
the criterion of exchange rate stability could be 
still assessed on a case-by-case basis for new 
entrants.
How can you use this research?
Policymakers and capital market participants can 
use this research to understand the determinants 
of exchange rate policies in small open 
economies. 
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